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Introduction1
In 2007 the EU published a Strategy for 
a  New  Partnership  with  Central  Asia. 
In  its  initial  stages  the  EU  focused  on 
developing new forums for dialogue with 
the Central Asian countries, and received 
some criticism for inadequate substantive 
actions. This Policy Brief argues that the 
current  global  economic  crisis  does  not 
alter  the  priorities  of  the  EU  Strategy, 
but  it  does  require  the  EU  to  stick  to 
existing obligations and also provides an 
opportunity  for  fresh  initiatives  to  better 
achieve  the  Strategy’s  fundamental 
goals. 
A striking feature of the five Central Asian 
countries’ economic strategies is that they 
followed divergent paths after becoming 
independent  in  1991.  Despite  strong 
similarities in culture, history and economic 
structure,  their  transitions  from  Soviet 
central  planning  ranged  from  the  most 
rapidly liberalising (the Kyrgyz Republic) 
to the most non-reforming (Turkmenistan) 
of  all  former  Soviet  republics.  By  the 
turn  of  the  century,  when  the  transition 
from  central  planning  was  essentially 
completed,  the  Central  Asian  countries 
had  created  vastly  different  economic 
systems. These differences had important 
implications for economic stability during 
1  This EUCAM Policy Brief is part of a mini-
series of three publications on the impact of the 
global slowdown on Central Asia and its relations 
with the European Union
the 1990s, for long-term growth prospects 
in  the  2000s,  and  for  the  impact  of  the 
global economic crisis that gathered pace 
in  2008-9.  The  Central  Asian  countries 
are  open  economies  in  the  sense  that 
international trade is important, but they 
have all been suspicious of integration into 
the global economy and have embraced 
globalisation to varying degrees. In general 
terms,  the  more  globally  integrated  an 
economy  is  the  better  its  performance 
was  over  the  last  two  decades,  but  the 
more exposed it was to crises.2 In Central 
Asia  this  generalisation  needs  to  be 
more  nuanced;  and  Section  2  relates  it 
to country-specific resource endowments 
and economic strategies.
The main implication for the EU Strategy 
is that what was desirable in 2007 is still 
desirable. Goals of strengthening human 
rights, rule of law, good governance and 
democratisation may be harder to achieve 
in straitened circumstances, but success 
is  connected  to  the  economic  goals  of 
promoting  economic  development,  trade 
and  investment  and  alleviating  poverty. 
Finally, the Strategy’s goal of strengthening 
energy and transport links may be easier 
in a period of low energy prices as long as 
the EU can turn the economic downturn 
into an opportunity rather than a threat.
2   See R. Ranciere, A. Tornell and F. Westermann 
(2008), “Systemic Crises and Growth”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 123(1); pp. 359-406 provide 
evidence of a positive relationship between crisis-
prone economies and growth.
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During the 1990s the Kyrgyz Republic was one of the leading 
reformers among former Soviet republics, inter alia the first to 
join the World Trade Organisation. Kazakhstan was also active 
in creating a market-driven economy. Both of these countries 
experienced  disappointing  economic  performance  over  the 
decade, and just as they were emerging from the transitional 
recession  both  economies  were  severely  hit  by  the  1998 
Russian Crisis.
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were more cautious reformers. 
Gradualism  was  a  good  short-term  strategy  to  minimise 
disruption from the end of central planning and the dissolution 
of the USSR. As the two largest cotton producers in the Soviet 
Union,  both  countries  benefited  from  the  ease  with  which 
cotton  could  be  shipped  to  global  rather  than  CIS  markets 
and from buoyant world cotton prices in the first half of the 
1990s. Uzbekistan was the best performing of all former Soviet 
republics during the 1990s, with the smallest decline in GDP 
and reasonably good social indicators. Turkmenistan, with a 
more autocratic leadership and negligible reforms, fared less 
well, despite revenue from cotton and gas exports, because 
the domestic economy was woefully inefficient.
Racked  by  civil  war  for  most  of  the  decade,  Tajikistan’s 
economic transition fell between these two pairs. The collapse 
of institutions led to rapid de facto privatisation, but limited the 
emergence of a well-functioning market economy. Tajikistan 
was a substantial exporter of cotton and aluminium, based on 
its hydroelectricity potential, but control over these key goods 
fluctuated in the civil war and maintenance of infrastructure 
such as irrigation systems was neglected.
By the start of the 21st century the five countries had differing 
potential  for  sustained  growth.  Uzbekistan  in  1996  and 
Turkmenistan in 1998 implemented stringent foreign exchange 
controls after their export earnings declined due to falling world 
cotton  prices,  exacerbated  in  Turkmenistan’s  case  by  poor 
revenues from gas sales. The controls were symptomatic of 
suspicion of the price mechanism, and of a ‘vent for surplus’ 
view of foreign trade by which production of cotton and gas 
beyond  domestic  needs  would  be  exchanged  for  imported 
goods. Trade was not part of a development strategy, and both 
countries promoted import-substituting industrialisation.
The negative consequences of these policies were recognised 
by Uzbekistan, but once in place they were hard to change 
because key individuals and groups benefited from exchange 
controls and barriers to imports (e.g. the state was able to 
manipulate prices to obtain a large share of cotton rents and 
owners and workers in inefficient industries were sheltered from 
competing imports). The controls were only gradually relaxed 
over the first decade of the 2000s. Consequently, Uzbekistan’s 
economy grew sluggishly and in the face of growing discontent, 
the regime became more repressive – an outcome highlighted 
by the demonstrations and deaths in Andijan in 2005.
In  Turkmenistan  the  response  of  President  Niyazov,  or 
Turkmenbashi the Great as he preferred to be known, was 
to retreat into autarchy. The approach was underpinned by 
the rise of world oil prices after 1998 which, with a time lag, 
3    For  more  details  see  The  Economies  of  Central  Asia,  (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton NJ, 1995) and The Central Asian Economies 
since Independence (Princeton University Press, 2006).
filtered through into higher prices for Turkmen gas exports. The 
pipeline system continued to leave Turkmenistan dependent on 
Russian demand, but as the price paid by the EU for Russian 
gas soared, Russia was keen to ensure supplies of Turkmen 
gas for its own customers. Turkmenbashi’s only international 
trip in the last years before his death in December 2006 was to 
China, driven by a desire to diversify gas export routes. More 
active foreign policy has been a keynote of the early years of 
the presidency of Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, Niyazov’s 
successor, with promises of increased gas exports to Russia, 
China and the EU, but the seriousness of these commitments 
and of pronouncements about economic reform are still to be 
tested.4
Kazakhstan  and  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  were  better  placed 
for  sustained  growth  over  the  last  decade  because  central 
planning had been replaced by better functioning market-based 
economies than in Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan. However, their 
relative  economic  fortunes  would  be  dominated  by  energy 
market developments. 
Kazakhstan’s  recovery  from  the  1998  crisis,  with  a  large 
devaluation  stimulating  export  growth  in  1999,  was 
overshadowed by oil exports. Kazakhstan’s huge oil reserves 
in  the  Caspian  Basin  were  finally  starting  to  flow  in  large 
quantities.  The  first  alternatives  to  the  Russian  Transneft 
pipeline were being constructed, and oil prices were starting a 
climb from under $10 a barrel in 1998 to a peak of almost $150 
in 2008. Kazakhstan was one of the fastest growing economies 
in the world in the decade starting in 1999. The oilboom fuelled 
confidence, government spending, a credit boom and an asset 
bubble centred on construction in the two main cities, Almaty 
and Astana. The financial sector, already the most dynamic 
in  Central  Asia  became  internationalised  as  banks  sought 
funds from abroad to meet the insatiable demand for credit 
domestically.5 Signs of a banking crisis started to emerge in 
2006 and 2007, before the global crisis but with similar roots 
to  the  US  sub-prime  crisis  (i.e.  over-exuberant  borrowing 
and  lenders  paying  less  and  less  attention  to  borrowers’ 
creditworthiness or the value of collateral).
In the absence of hydrocarbons or other major exportables 
apart  from  a  single  goldmine,  the  performance  of  the 
Kyrgyz economy was weaker, and the political situation was 
plagued  by  uncertainty.  All  of  the  Central  Asian  countries 
have established super-presidential regimes, but parliament 
is  least  weak  in  the  Kyrgyz  Republic.  Moreover,  alone 
among the Central Asian countries, the Kyrgyz Republic has 
experienced a political succession not associated with civil war 
or bereavement. Nevertheless, the domestic political situation 
remains unstable, with rampant corruption and a disappointing 
economic performance. Internationally, Kyrgyzstan has been 
the most consistently pro-Western of the countries and hosts 
the last remaining US base in Central Asia, although at the time 
of writing the base’s future is limited.6 Northern Kyrgyzstan is 
increasingly economically dominated by its richer neighbours 
to the north, with many workers migrating to Kazakhstan or 
Russia and a financial system dominated by Kazakh banks 
4   R. Pomfret, “Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy”, The China and Eurasian 
Forum Quarterly 6(4), November 2008, pp. 9-34 (available at http://www.
isdp.eu/cefq).
5   The first substantial foreign investment in the banking sector was in 
November 2007 when the Italian bank UniCredit paid $2.1 billion for a 
91.8% stake in ATF Bank, Kazakhstan’s fifth largest bank.
6   In February 2009 the Kyrgyz Republic gave the USA six months’ notice 
to vacate the airbase.
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For Tajikistan peace and the authority of the central government 
were established between 1997 and 2001, but many institutions 
remain weak. A huge percentage of the male population works 
abroad, mainly in Russia, and remittances are the country’s 
major source of foreign exchange; although data are sketchy, 
the share of remittances in GDP is perhaps the highest in the 
world.7 The resident population remains desperately poor.
 2. Globalisation and Central Asia
The  Central  Asian  economies  are  open  but  they  are  not 
integrated  into  the  global  economy  in  particularly  complex 
ways. Kazakhstan as the richest and most developed economy 
in the region has the most complex relations to globalisation, 
but even there suspicion of losing autonomy (reflected in the 
slow progress of WTO accession negotiations) has limited the 
degree of globalisation of the Kazakhstani economy. The main 
channels of globalisation, and hence for contagion from the 
global economic crisis, run through (1) the financial sector, (2) 
trade, and (3) migration and remittances. The last is important 
because  hundreds  of  thousands  of  workers  from  Tajikistan 
and to a lesser extent the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan are 
working abroad and their prospects will be directly influenced 
by economic conditions in Russia and elsewhere.
2.1. Finance
Over the last decade Kazakhstan’s economy has been the 
success story of Central Asia. Among the jewels of the market-
driven economy have been the banks, sometimes claimed to 
be the most efficient in the CIS, and expanding first into the 
Kyrgyz Republic, where over 70% of the assets of the banking 
sector are Kazakh-owned, and more recently into Tajikistan. 
Kazakhstan’s  banks  became  increasingly  integrated  into 
global  financial markets. As Almaty and Astana in the mid-
2000s experienced a real estate boom, banks lent to borrowers 
eager not to miss out in the property market and as demand 
for  credit  outran  domestic  savings  the  banks  borrowed  in 
international  markets.  By  2006,  Kazakhstan’s  banks  were 
raising large amounts of capital abroad, where the cost was 
less than the double-digit interest rates that they could charge 
borrowers at home. In the first half of 2007, medium- and long-
term debt-creating capital inflows more than doubled, largely 
due to external borrowing by the banking sector. The maturity 
mismatch  between  the  foreign  assets  and  the  banks’  loan 
portfolios caused problems when the foreign institutions began 
to worry about Kazakhstan’s external obligations and when 
loosening of the exchange rate peg caused domestic banks to 
reassess their foreign currency exposure.8 
In  2007  Kazakhstan’s  banks  started  to  compete  in  making 
deposits  more  attractive  and  substantially  increased  the 
interest rates on loans, which by year’s end had reached about 
20%, double the rates of two years’ earlier. In November 2007, 
the government provided support of around $4 billion, targeted 
at construction projects in danger of being abandoned half-
7   See A. Kireyev, The Macroeconomics of Remittances: The Case of 
Tajikistan, IMF Working Paper 06/2, January 2006.
8   For more details see R. Pomfret, “Kazakhstan’s Banking Problems”, 
Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 20 February 2008 (e journal available at 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=issueachive).
finished, and the central bank raised the official refinancing rate, 
which had been unchanged at 9% since July 2006, to 11%.9 
In late 2007, Standard and Poor’s downgraded Kazakhstan’s 
sovereign debt to BBB - the lowest grade above speculative. 
By 2008, Kazakhstan’s financial sector problems were coinciding 
with the emergence of a global financial crisis, but the origins 
of the domestic financial crisis were home-grown. The banks’ 
problems arose from loan portfolios overweighted in domestic 
real estate projects, not from buying over-risky financial assets 
in the global market. Kazakhstan’s banks had been borrowers in 
the global financial markets rather than investing in toxic assets 
coming out of the US financial system. Moreover, although 
the banking crisis will have substantial economic costs, they 
are not unbearable because the authorities are well-placed to 
finance an economic stimulus using the earnings accumulated 
during the 1999-2008 oilboom.
The  financial  sectors  of  the  other  Central  Asian  countries 
are even less exposed to turmoil in global financial markets. 
The Kyrgyz financial sector is dominated by Kazakh banks, 
so its financial sector worries are largely tied to Kazakhstan’s. 
The  banking  sector  in  Uzbekistan  is  dominated  by  state 
banks which are conservative in their international activities. 
Turkmenistan’s financial sector is even more repressed and 
the only significant transactions are processing revenues from 
gas and cotton exports and transferring remittances. Tajikistan 
is too poor to have an internationally integrated financial sector 
beyond transferring remittances.
 2.2. Trade
The Central Asian countries have high export/GDP ratios (see 
Table  1),  except  for  Tajikistan  whose  ratio  would  be  much 
higher if exports of labour services were included (remittances 
are guesstimated to be equal to about a third of GDP). Despite 
efforts to diversify their economies by using revenues from 
energy, mineral or cotton exports or through import-substituting 
policies  or  other  measures,  the  Central  Asian  countries’ 
exports  remain  heavily  concentrated  in  a  small  number  of 
commodities.
Table 1. Openness and Major Exports
Exports/GDP % Major exports
2006 2007
Kazakhstan 51 49
Oil,  minerals,  iron  and  steel, 
grain
Kyrgyz Rep 42 45 Gold, cotton
Tajikistan 23 21 Aluminium, cotton
Turkmenistan 72 63 Gas, cotton
Uzbekistan 38 40 Cotton, gold, gas
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators at www.worldbank.org 
(accessed 27 April 2009).
The  commodity  concentration  of  exports  is  high  in  all  five 
countries, although it fluctuates as world prices change and, 
especially in Tajikistan’s case, due to volatile quantities. For 
Kazakhstan,  oil  accounted  for  over  60%  of  exports  by  the 
height of the oilboom, up from just under 40% in 1999, when 
grains, various minerals and iron and steel products were all 
major export items. Turkmenistan’s data are non-transparent, 
9   The full amount owed by Kazakhstan’s banks to foreign creditors is 
unclear. According to the Financial Times, in October 2007 Kazakh banks’ 
international borrowings totalled $40 billion, and conservative estimates 
put the banks’ foreign debt due in 2008 at around $12 billion.
3 Central Asia and the Global Economic Crisisbut natural gas and to a lesser extent oil have come to almost 
totally dominate exports as cotton production declined. Gold 
and  cotton  fibre  account  for  about  45%  of  Kyrgyz  exports. 
Cotton  fibre,  gold  and  natural  gas  accounted  for  68%  of 
Uzbekistan’s  exports  in  1999  and,  despite  efforts  at  export 
diversification, their share has remained over 60%. Over 80% 
of Tajikistan’s exports in 2004 consisted of aluminium and 
cotton,  but  the  output  of  both  commodities  varies 
substantially from year-to-year.10
Thus, apart from demand for migrant labour, the primary 
channel through which the global financial crisis is likely 
to hit Central Asia is through reduced demand for key 
commodities and this impact will be country-specific. In 
2008 and early 2009, the impact has primarily been felt 
by the energy exporters, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 
Adjusting to the end of the oilboom and the bursting of an 
asset bubble is a major problem for Kazakhstan, but with 
its much higher income levels and accumulated reserves 
Kazakhstan is the Central Asian country best-placed to 
tighten  belts.  Turkmenistan  has  been  less  exposed  to 
global energy market developments because gas prices 
are  less  volatile  than  oil  prices.  Turkmenistan  under 
new leadership may also be well-placed to weather an 
energy-price bust, if better economic management leads 
to  increasing  gas  output  and  if  pipeline  routes  can  be 
diversified to reduce dependence on Russian routes.
Grain  prices  fell  in  2008  from  a  short-term  peak. This 
should help the poorest countries, which are net importers 
of  food.  Kazakhstan  is  a  major  grain  exporter,  but 
Kazakhstan’s farmers benefited in the 2000s from an improved 
policy environment which left them with a larger share of net 
revenues.11
World  cotton  prices  are  of  importance  to  all  Central Asian 
10    The  numbers  in  this  paragraph  draw  on  the  Asian  Development 
Bank report Central Asia: Increasing gains from trade through regional 
cooperation in trade policy, transport, and customs transit (Manila 2006). 
11   Estimates of producer support to farmers are contained in R. Pomfret, 
“Kazakhstan”, in Kym Anderson and Johan Swinnen (eds), Distortions to 
Agricultural  Incentives  in  Europe’s  Transition  Economies,  World  Bank, 
Washington, D.C., 2008, pp. 219-63.
countries, and especially to Uzbekistan, which is the world’s 
fourth largest exporter. Although world cotton prices fluctuate, 
there was no clear trend during the 2000s. There was an upturn 
in 2007-8 but this corrected in the third quarter of 2008.12 
For  the  region’s  gold  exporters  (the  Kyrgyz  Republic  and 
Uzbekistan)  concerns  about  a  global  recession  have  a 
positive impact on export earnings. Gold prices, which were 
languishing around $300 per ounce in the early 2000s, began 
to surge in mid-decade and as financial concerns mounted in 
2007 they rose above $900. Despite a dip in 2008, gold prices 
have returned to these highs in 2009 (see Figure 2).
Tajikistan’s  main  exporter  is  the  Talco  aluminium  smelter 
utilising the country’s abundant hydro resources. Aluminium 
exports normally account for over half of the country’s export 
earnings, although earnings suffered a precipitous decline in 
2008-9 as global prices for aluminium collapsed (see Figure 
3). Tajikistan should have benefited from surging world prices 
during the 2000s, but output was often disrupted and whether 
the proceeds from the smelter benefit the country is unclear. 
The IMF has publicly stated that data on the flow of funds have 
been falsified. Talco revenues accrue to a company registered 
in the British Virgin Islands, and large amounts have been 
siphoned off by well-connected individuals; a corruption trial 
is in progress in London.13 This is symptomatic of Tajikistan’s 
institutional problems, which make it close to being a failed 
state.
12   According to the ‘Cotlook A’ price index, which is the average of the 
lowest five of nineteen prices for cotton delivered in Asian ports, cotton 
prices reached a peak at 92 US cents/lb in 1994/95, after which they fell by 
more than half to 42 cents/lb in 2001/02 before recovering to 68 cents in 
2003/04.  On 27 April 2009 the index stood at 59 cents.
13   See J. Helmer, “IMF blows Whistle on Tajik Corruption”, Asia Times 
Online, 26 March 2008 (www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JC26Ag01.
html – accessed 30 April 2009). The London trial, in which Talco is trying to 
recoup $500 million from two former employees, is estimated to be costing 
about 5% of Tajikistan’s GDP (“Tajikistan: Aluminum Plant embroiled in 
Protracted Expensive Legal Case”, Eurasianet, 14 November 2008).
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Figure 1. World Cotton Prices, 2004-9
Source:  Cotlook A(FE)  index,  graph  from  the  National  Cotton  Council 
of  America  at  http://www.cotton.org/econ/prices/cotlook-a-indices.cfm\ 
(downloaded 30 April 2009.)
Figure 2. World Gold Prices, 1999-2009
Source:  Gold  Price  Australia,  at  http://goldprice.org/charts/history/gold_10_
year_o_usd.png (accessed 27 April 2009.)Figure 3. World Aluminium Prices, 1999-2009
Source:  London  Metal  Exchange  at  http://www.lme.co.uk/aluminium_
graphs.asp (accessed 27 April 2009.)
3. Implications for EU Policy
The implications from the above analysis are that the global 
economic crisis should have little influence on EU economic 
policy towards Central Asia. What would have been desirable 
in  the  absence  of  the  crisis  is  still  desirable. At  the  same 
time, while the impact of the global economic downturn may 
be comparatively benign in the region, it will raise important 
challenges that will affect the EU Strategy in the region. Growing 
unemployment and poverty may increase social tensions and 
even be the source for conflicts. This suggests that the EU and 
international organisations should re-examine some of their 
existing programmes in the areas of poverty alleviation and 
conflict prevention in light of the changed circumstances
EU members should keep their borders open to imports 
from  Central  Asia.  The  Central  Asian  countries’  exports 
remain  heavily  concentrated  in  a  few  commodities,  but  all 
governments recognise the desirability of export diversification 
and this should not be hampered by closed doors in Europe. All 
EU countries claim commitment to avoiding protectionism, but 
all are under domestic pressure to protect domestic producers, 
and weak trading partners are the softest targets. The EU must 
ensure that members do not undermine European relations with 
Central Asia by throttling non-traditional export opportunities.
The EU can help Central Asia by living up to its commitment 
to  promote  regional  cooperation.  The  BOMCA/CADAP 
programme,  which  in  its  early  years  focused  too  much  on 
restricting  the  drugs  trade,  now  plays  an  unspectacular, 
but  worthwhile  role  in  improving  border  management  and 
facilitating  trade.  Trade  facilitation  is  most  vital  to  the  two 
poorest and most geographically isolated countries, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan. Such measures should be in cooperation with 
multilateral  agencies,  e.g.  through  CAREC.14  The  EU  can 
provide  a  European  dimension  by  supporting  initiatives  to 
develop trade corridors such as the E40 Tashkent–Berlin road, 
which for hundreds of kilometres is little more than a dirt track 
through the desert.
14    Central  Asia  Regional  Economic  Cooperation  (CAREC)  involves 
eight countries and an alliance of multilateral institutions comprising Asian 
Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
International Monetary Fund, Islamic Development Bank, United Nations 
Development Programme, and World Bank. 
The EU’s commitment to poverty alleviation in Central Asia 
requires that resources be made available to Kyrgyzstan 
and  Tajikistan,  the  region’s  two  poorest  countries  and  the 
ones most severely hit by the global crisis. Domestic labour 
markets in these countries will be destabilised by returning 
migrants unable to find work in Russia or Kazakhstan. Aid will 
be necessary to help provide domestic employment and for 
humanitarian reasons.
Perhaps  most  imaginatively,  the  EU  could  use  an  era  of 
subdued energy prices to put together a coherent long-
term strategy towards energy security and relations with 
Central Asian producers. It is important to place EU support 
for  specific  projects  in  the  context  of  changing  attitudes 
towards  renewable  energy  and  changing  technology  (e.g. 
liquefaction technology that may transform the economics of 
gas pipelines). Nevertheless, the headlines in the near future 
will concern pipeline routes and their geopolitical undertones; 
especially  where  pipelines  might  be  mutually  exclusive,  as 
with the Russian-favoured South Stream and the US-backed 
Nabucco route, it is important to develop a coherent approach 
in the best interest of the EU and Central Asia.
 4. Conclusions
The global recession’s impact has been relatively benign for 
Central Asia. Kazakhstan, the country most integrated into the 
global  economy  and  potentially  most  harmed  by  the  global 
crisis, is the country best-prepared for negative financial and 
trade  effects.  Uzbekistan  and  Turkmenistan  have  foregone 
economic benefits from global integration, but by the same token 
are relatively insulated from external shocks other than through 
commodity prices. The Kyrgyz Republic is in an intermediate 
position, but its major export commodity, gold, often does well 
during recessions and 2008-9 has been no exception. A more 
significant transmission for the poorer countries is migration, 
and the direst negative impact is through the reduced flow of 
remittances to Tajikistan, the poorest country in the region.
Recession is a threat to Central Asia, as economic hardship may 
lead to increased repression, challenging the EU’s commitment 
to human rights and democratisation in the region. However, 
global recession also presents opportunities. So far the EU has 
played a minor role in Central Asia. Despite grand overarching 
statements in the 2007 Strategy and high level meetings in 
2008, questions remain about the EU’s ability to deliver on its 
promises to foster a broad range of engagements with Central 
Asia.15 The shifting positions of other interested parties offer 
an opportunity to change this. China is using the commodity 
bust to buy into resources. Russia is more subdued than when 
oil prices were high. The US has a new administration. Iran 
has upcoming elections. The EU is committed to pursuing the 
Central Asia Strategy through the Swedish Presidency until the 
end of 2009, and in 2010 Kazakhstan will chair the OSCE. The 
EU should keep nimble in these shifting circumstances.
15   N. Melvin and J. Boonstra, The EU Strategy for Central Asia @ Year 
One, EUCAM Policy Brief No. 1, October 2008.
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•  Democracy and Human Rights 
•  Security and Stability 
•  Energy and Natural Resources 
•  Education and Social Relations 
EUCAM will produce the following series of publications:
 - A bi-monthly newsletter on EU-Central Asia relations will be produced and 
distributed broadly by means of an email list server using the CEPS and FRIDE 
networks. The newsletter contains the latest documents on EU-Central Asia 
relations, up-to-date information on the EU’s progress in implementing the 
Strategy and developments in Central Asian countries.
  -  Policy  briefs  will  be  written  by  permanent  and  ad  hoc  Working  Group 
members. The majority of the papers examine issues related to the four core 
themes  identified  above,  with  other  papers  commissioned  in  response  to 
emerging areas beyond the main themes.
 - Commentaries on the evolving partnership between the EU and the states 
of Central Asia will be commissioned reflecting specific developments in the 
EU-Central Asian relationship. 
  - A  final  monitoring  report  of  the  EUCAM  Expert  Working  Group  will  be 
produced by the project rapporteurs. 
This  monitoring  exercise  is  implemented  by  an  Expert  Working  Group, 
established by FRIDE and CEPS. The group consists of experts from the 
Central Asian states and the members countries of the EU. In addition to 
expert  meetings,  several  public  seminars  will  be  organised  for  a  broad 
audience including EU representatives, national officials and legislators, the 
local civil society community, media and other stakeholders. 
EUCAM  is  sponsored  by  the  Open  Society  Institute  (OSI)  and  the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The project is also supported 
by the Czech Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Spanish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and the United Kingdom Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office.
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in 1983, the Centre for 
European Policy Studies 
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most experienced and 
authoritative think tanks 
operating in the European 
Union today. CEPS serves 
as a leading forum for 
debate on EU affairs, and 
its most distinguishing 
feature lies in its strong 
in-house research 
capacity, complemented 
by an extensive network 
of partner institutes 
throughout the world. 
CEPS aims to carry 
out state-of-the-art 
policy research leading 
to solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe 
today and to achieve high 
standards of academic 
excellence and maintain 
unqualified independence. 
CEPS also provides a 
forum for discussion 
among all stakeholders 
in the European policy 
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collaborative networks 
of researchers, policy-
makers and business 
representatives across the 
whole of Europe. 
About 
FRIDE
FRIDE is a think tank 
based in Madrid 
that aims to provide 
original and innovative 
thinking on Europe’s 
role in the international 
arena. It strives to 
break new ground 
in its core research 
interests – peace and 
security, human rights, 
democracy promotion 
and development and 
humanitarian aid – 
and mould debate in 
governmental and 
nongovernmental 
bodies through rigorous 
analysis, rooted in 
the values of justice, 
equality and democracy.
As a prominent 
European think tank, 
FRIDE benefits from 
political independence, 
diversity of views 
and the intellectual 
background of its 
international staff. 
Since its establishment 
in 1999, FRIDE has 
organised or participated 
in the creation and 
development of various 
projects that reinforce 
not only FRIDE’s 
commitment to debate 
and analysis, but also to 
progressive action and 
thinking. 
www.fride.org www.ceps.eu